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NOTES
PAYMENT OF THE DEBT OF ANOTHER: REIMBURSEMENT BY THE
DISCHARGED DEBTOR
In Cox v. W.M. Heroman & Co.,' an unpaid supplier of the
plaintiff subcontractor threatened to lien a job unless the general
contractor paid him the undisputed portion of his claim against the
subcontractor. The subcontract agreement authorized the general
contractor to withhold payments from the subcontractor if the sup-
pliers were not paid. Despite the subcontractor's objection to a direct
payment, the general contractor paid the materialman. When the
subcontractor sued for the balance due on the subcontract, the
general contractor claimed compensation had taken place in the
amount paid directly to the supplier. The Louisiana supreme court
held that although the general contractor could not claim reimburse-
ment from the subcontractor for extinguishing his debt, he was
entitled to compensation by reason of a conventional partial subroga-
tion.
Payment, being performance of an obligation, generally extin-
guishes the principal obligation and its accessories.2 The debtor him-
self can effect payment, as can an interested third party3 and,
usually, even an uninterested party acting in the debtor's name or in
his own name.' There are several means by which one who pays the
1. 298 So. 2d 848 (La. 1974).
2. LA. Cv. CODE art. 2131.
3. An "interested third party" is one bound with or for the debtor, such as a co-
obligor or a surety. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2134. This is a much narrower definition than
that used at common law, which allows anyone who pays another's debt in order to
protect his own interest to be equitably subrogated to the original creditor's claim.
E.g., Hult v. Ebinger, 222 Ore. 169, 352 P.2d 583 (1960). While the general contractor
in Cox acted to protect his own interest since the unpaid supplier had threatened to
lien the job, he was not at the time of payment a co-obligor with the subcontractor,
nor was he the subcontractor's surety, and was therefore not one concerned in the debt
within the meaning of article 2134.
The creditor may refuse performance of the obligation by any third party, whether
interested or uninterested, if the creditor has an interest in the debtor's personal
performance. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2136-37; 4 AUBRY & RAu, DROIT CIVIL FRANqAIS § 316
(6th ed. Bartin 1942) in 1 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 156 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1965)
[hereinafter cited as AUBRY & RAu]; 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 1, no. 401, at
234 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959) [hereinafter cited as PLANIOL]. The creditor
may also refuse payment by a third party if the payor's motive in exercising his right
is to somehow harm the debtor. See Comment, 7 TUL. L. REv. 426 (1933), cited by the
court in Cox. The third party's right to pay another's debt may also be affected by a
contract between him and the debtor. See Hardin v. Federal Rice Mill Co., 164 La.
49, 113 So. 760 (1927).
4. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2134 provides: "The obligation may even be discharged by
a third person no way concerned in it, provided that person act in the name and for
the discharge of the debtor, or that, if he act in his own name, he be not subrogated to
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debt of another may recover the amount paid from the discharged
debtor. The third party may claim reimbursement as a negotiorum
gestor for ordinary and useful expenditures made on the debtor's
behalf.6 However, not every third party who pays the debt of another
is entitled to recover from him on this basis.' Since negotiorum gestio
is an implied mandate based upon the presumed consent of the party
whose business is transacted, the debtor's objection to the third
the rights of the creditor." The right of the uninterested third party to extinguish the
debtor's obligation is for the debtor's benefit, since it is based upon negotiorum gestio.
See Gernon v. McCan, 23 La. Ann. 84 (1871); Thompson v. Chretien, 3 La. Ann. 116
(1848); Standard Motor Car Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 97 So. 2d 435 (La.
App. lst Cir. 1957). The Louisiana jurisprudence has been conflicting as to whether
the third party may claim reimbursement as a gestor when he has acted primarily for
his own benefit rather than that of the debtor, even though the debtor has in fact
benefited from the discharge of his obligation. See Pharr v. Broussard, 106 La. 59, 30
So. 296 (1901); Woodlief & Legendre v. Moncure, 17 La. Ann. 241 (1865); Tate v.
Dupuis, 195 So. 810 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940). But see State ex rel Klein & Co. v.
Pilsbury, 29 La. Ann. 787 (1877); Gernon v. McCan, 23 La. Ann. 84 (1871); Standard
Motor Car Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 97 So. 2d 435, 439 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1957). Roman law clearly required that the gestor's acts be motivated by a desire to
benefit the principal, and not with the intent of benefiting himself. See, e.g., DIGEST
3.5.6.3; 3 P. COLQUHOUN, SUMMARY OF THE ROMAN CrVIL LAw 105 (1854) [hereinafter
cited as COLQUHOUN]; H. JoLowicz, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN
LAw 533, 536 (1932) [hereinafter cited as JoLowicz].
5. Negotiorum gestio is a civil law institution which arises when one person, the
negotiorum gestor, undertakes on his own initiative to manage the affairs of another.
See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2295-2300; DIGEST 3.5; COLQUHOUN 103-06; JOLOWICZ 530-36.
6. The Louisiana courts have not made clear the precise amount the gestor is
entitled to recover. Two early cases allowed recovery for all amounts which the gestor
expended, so long as they were useful and necessary at the time payment was made.
Roman & Kernion v. Forstall, 11 La. Ann. 717 (1856); Eylers v. Ruby Motors Co., 123
So. 477 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1929). Other cases, however, have limited the gestor's recov-
ery from the debtor to the amount which actually inured to the debtor's benefit. Smith
v. Town of Vinton, 216 La. 9, 43 So. 2d 18 (1949); Fishel v. Mercier, 37 La. Ann. 356
(1885); Pierce v. Flower, 5 Mart. (O.S.) 388 (La. 1818).
7. One who pays the debt of another and who cannot for some reason recover as a
negotiorum gestor may nevertheless have an action against the debtor to recover the
amount paid which benefited the debtor. Traditionally, Louisiana courts have been
unreceptive to actions based on unjust enrichment, unless a tortious act was also
committed by the person enriched. E.g., Kramer v. Freeman, 198 La. 244, 3 So. 2d
609 (1941); Standard Oil Co. v. Sugar Prod. Co., 160 La. 763, 107 So. 566 (1926);
McWilliams v. Hagan, 4 Rob. 374 (La. 1843); Harvey v. Surles, 228 So. 2d 167 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1969). Recently, however, Louisiana courts have entertained claims for
unjustified enrichment in the form of the action de in rem versa. See Edmonston v.
A-Second Mtg. Co., 289 So. 2d 116 (La. 1974); Minyard v. Curtis Prod., Inc., 251 La.
624, 205 So. 2d 422 (1967); Joslyn v. Manship, 238 So. 2d 20 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970);
Nicholas, Unjustified Enrichment in the Civil Law and Louisiana Law (pts. 1-2), 36
TUL. L. REy. 605, 37 TuL. L. REy. 49 (1962).
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party's act in his behalf prevents the uninterested third party from
recovering sums expended to discharge the obligation.8
An uninterested third party who has been subrogated to the
rights of the original creditor, either conventionally' or legally,'0 may
also claim reimbursement from the discharged obligor. If the subro-
gation by the creditor is conventional he must agree to it "at the same
time" as the payment is made." Louisiana cases reflect two interpre-
tations of this requirement: some indicate that the agreement must
be simultaneous with the payment," while others assert that the
creditor's consent may be given at any time prior to the payment.' 3
The creditor's consent to a conventional subrogation must always be
expressly given," but since conventionql subrogation by the creditor
exists for his benefit, enabling him to offer a quid pro quo to a third
party willing to pay him, the debtor's consent to total subrogation is
not required.'5 Some cases, however, analogizing partial subrogation
to partial assignment, have indicated that where the subrogation is
only partial, the debtor's consent is required.'" Payment with subro-
8. See Succession of Mulligan v. Kenny, 34 La. Ann. 50 (1882); O'Hara v. Krantz,
26 La. Ann. 504 (1874); Woodlief & Legendre v. Moncure, 17 La. Ann. 241 (1865); Fox
v. Sloo, 10 La. Ann. 11 (1855); Nicholls v. His Creditors, 9 Rob. 476 (La. 1845); SPANISH
CIV. CODE art. 1158; LAS SIETE PARTIDAS bk. 5, tit. 7, L. 26 (Scott transl. 1931); DIGEST
3.5.8.3; CODE 2.19.24; COLQUHOUN 106. But see Gernon v. McCan, 23 La. Ann. 84, 87
(1871).
9. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2160 provides for conventional subrogation both by the
creditor and by the debtor.
10. Since legal subrogation arises by operation of law at the time payment is
made, consent of the parties is unnecessary. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1760, 2292, 2161. For
instances in which legal subrogation arises in Louisiana, see LA. Cirv. CODE art. 2161;
LA. R.S. 6:42, 6:455, 7:175, 9:3903, 33:785, 47:2105 (1950); LA. R.S. 23:1162, as
amended by La. Acts 1962, No. 457 § 1.
11. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2160(1).
12. See Brice v. Watkins, 30 La. Ann. 21 (1878); Succession of Wilson, 1i La. Ann.
294 (1856); Harrison v. Bisland, 5 Rob. 204 (La. 1843).
13. See Forcum-James Co. v. Duke Transp. Co., 231 La. 953, 93 So. 2d 228 (1957);
Cooper v. Jennings Ref. Co., 118 La. 181, 42 So. 766 (1907); Sewall v. Howard, 15 La.
Ann. 400 (1860); Baldwin v. LeLong, 143 So. 723 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1932). This view,
while not consistent with a strict interpretation of the language of LA. Crv. CODE art.
2160(1), is nonetheless consistent with its theoretical basis-that an attempt to effec-
tuate subrogation after the payment is made is an attempt to revive an extinguished
obligation. See AUBRY & RAu § 321.
14. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2160(1).
15. AUBRY & RAU § 321. If the subrogation is legal rather than conventional,
neither the consent of the debtor nor the original creditor is necessary. LA. Civ. CODE
arts. 2161, 1760(1), 2292.
16. Language in earlier cases involving partial assignments indicated in dicta that
the debtor's consent is necessary for a partial subrogation. See Staples v. Rush, 99 So.
2d 502, 506 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957); Stein v. Williams Lumber Co., 36 So. 2d 62, 64
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gation extinguishes the debt as between the debtor and the original
creditor, but the principal obligation and its accessories continue to
exist in favor of the subrogee,17 who can recover from the debtor only
the amount actually paid to the original creditor."S
In the instant case, the court first considered whether the general
contractor, as an uninterested third party, was entitled to pay the
debt due by the subcontractor to the supplier and to be reimbursed
by the subcontractor for the payment. Justice Tate, writing for the
majority, held that "by reason of the totality of the circumstances"'"
including the contract between the general contractor and the sub-
contractor" and the latter's protest, the general contractor did not
have the right under Civil Code article 2134 to directly pay the sup-
plier and claim reimbursement as a negotiorum gestor.2'
The court then examined the general contractor's claim that he
was conventionally subrogated to the supplier's rights against the
subcontractor, and was therefore entitled to credit the amount paid
against his liability under the subcontract. The court found a conven-
tional subrogation resulting from the supplier's statement that the
general contractor would be subrogated to his rights upon payment
of the debt and the general contractor's acceptance of this offer by
making actual payment, 2 even though the creditor's consent to the
subrogation and the act of payment were not simultaneous. The
debtor's protest did not affect the supplier's right to subrogate the
general contractor to his claim, since subrogation under Civil Code
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1948). Where partial assignment is involved, the debtor's consent
is clearly needed. Red River Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Louisiana Petrolithic Constr.
Co., 142 La. 838, 77 So. 763 (1918); Cantrelle v. Le Goaster, 3 Rob. 432 (La. 1843);
King v. Havard, 5 Mart. (N.S.) 194 (La. 1826); Marmol v. Wright, 62 So. 2d 528 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1953).
17. See, e.g., Roman v. Forstall, 11 La. Ann. 717 (1856); Keller v. Thompson, 121
So. 2d 575 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Gallien, 111 So.
2d 571 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959). Payment with subrogation may be regarded either as
an exception to the general rule that payment completely extinguishes the obligation,
or as a legal fiction by which an extinguished obligation is considered as continuing in
favor of the subrogee. AuBRY & RAu §§ 316, 321; 2 PLANIOL pt. 1, no. 477, at 273.
18. E.g., Shropshire v. His Creditors, 15 La. Ann. 705 (1860); R.F. Mestayer
Lumber Co. v. Cusack, 141 So. 2d 166 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
19. Cox v. W.M. Heroman & Co., 298 So. 2d 848, 854 (La. 1974).
20. The contract in the instant case provided that if the subcontractor fell behind
in his payments to suppliers, the general contractor could withhold sums due the
subcontractor until the suppliers were paid.
21. See notes 4, 5 supra. The court noted that although the general contractor
could not recover as a gestor, he did have a possible action de in rem verso to recover
to the extent the subcontractor was benefited by the payment. See note 7 supra.
22. Cox v. W.M. Heroman & Co., 298 So. 2d 848, 854-55 (La. 1974).
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article 2161(1) is allowed for the benefit of the creditor rather than
the debtor. In rejecting the need for the debtor's consent to effect a
partial subrogation, the court repudiated the line of cases so indicat-
ing. 3 The court agreed that the debtor's consent would be required
in a partial assignment, the purpose of which is the sale of a credit,
because the debtor's interest in avoiding the necessity of paying his
debt to multiple claimants outweighs the creditor's interest in selling
a portion of the credit. However, in a partial subrogation, the interest
of the creditor in receiving partial payment of the debt in return for
subrogation outweighs the debtor's interest in avoiding the burden of
paying his debt to several claimants. Since the contractor established
the subcontractor's liability to the supplier to be greater than the
amount paid by the general contractor,"4 the court held the general
contractor was entitled to compensation in the amount paid the
supplier.
The court's refusal to allow reimbursement under negotiorum
gestio, based upon the "totality of the circumstances" 5 of the case
rather than upon an evaluation of the weight accorded each factor,
does not clarify the confused jurisprudence." A clear indication by
the court of the relative significance of the debtor's protest and the
provision in the subcontract regulating the contractor's rights in the
event of the subcontractor's failure to pay suppliers would have been
helpful. The provision in the subcontract granting the general con-
tractor one method of dealing with the subcontractor's failure to pay
his materialmen does not clearly indicate that the parties intended
this to be the exclusive remedy. 7 It could be argued that the general
contractor retained a right as an uninterested third party to pay the
subcontractor's debt and demand reimbursement. Nevertheless, the
debtor's objection to the third party's act should alone be sufficient
to bar the payor's recovery as a negotiorum gestor, since such a
23. See note 16 supra.
24. The supplier held unpaid invoices totaling $8,360.55, of which the subcontrac-
tor contested only about $2500.00. The general contractor paid the supplier $4,349.74
with funds due the subcontractor, to be credited against the sum owed the supplier
by the subcontractor.
25. Cox v. W.M. Heroman & Co., 298 So. 2d 848, 854 (La. 1974).
26. See note 4 supra.
27. The court, however, indicates that the provision in the contract authorizing
the general contractor to withhold payments to the subcontractor if suppliers were not
paid might limit his right to pay the suppliers directly and recover the amount paid
from the subcontractor. Cox v. W.H. Heroman & Co., 298 So. 2d 848, 854 (La. 1974).
This difficulty would be avoided if the contract itself provided that the general contrac-




protest would clearly negate the presumed consent upon which
negotiorum gestio is founded.28
The court's interpretation of Civil Code article 2161(1) as allow-
ing the creditor's consent to the conventional subrogation at any time
before payment is made is consistent with the reason for the provi-
sion-that an attempt to subrogate after payment is made is an
attempt to revive an extinguished obligation.29 This interpretation
allows parties greater flexibility in their dealings than if payment and
subrogation were required to be simultaneous." Although its reason-
ing is perhaps not entirely clear,3' the court does settle the law con-
cerning the role of the debtor's consent in partial subrogation as
opposed to partial assignment.
The court in Cox carefully limits its holding to payment of a sum
which the debtor clearly owed. Should the subrogee assert a seriously
disputed claim a different situation would be presented. When a
subrogee sues on the subrogated claim, his rights are no greater than
those of the subrogor-he bears the burden of establishing the exist-
28. But see Cox v. W.M. Heroman & Co., 282 So. 2d 734 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973),
in which the First Circuit Court of Appeal allowed the general contractor to recover
the amount paid as a negotiorum gestor. If the payor's recovery is barred under
negotiorum gestio, he would still have a potential action de in rem verso, (note 7
supra), although his recovery would be limited to the amount benefiting the debtor. If
there was a defense whereby the debtor could have avoided payment, he would of
course not be enriched by the payment, and the payor would recover nothing from him.
The payor's only recourse would be against the original creditor under Civil Code
articles 2301-14, regulating payment of a thing not due.
29. See note 13 supra.
30. Justice Dixon, dissenting, argues that Civil Code article 2160(1) is explicit,
and should be construed literally to require the creditor's consent to the subrogation
to be given at the time the payment is made. 298 So. 2d at 857. He believes that the
instant case should be decided on the basis of legal subrogation under Civil Code
article 2161(3). Id. at 858. The majority's decision may indicate an intention to abide
by its dictum in Pringle-Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Eanes, 254 La. 705, 718, 226 So.
2d 502, 506 (1969), that one "bound with or for others" under Civil Code article 2161(3)
encompasses only solidary obligors and- sureties, and does not extend to all who may
ultimately be held liable for the debt.
31. The court states that the reason the debtor's consent is needed for an effective
partial assignment but not for a partial subrogation is that assignment and subrogation
have different purposes. Since the inconvenience to the debtor is the same whether
partial subrogation or partial assignment is involved, a difference in the purposes of
the institutions should not make an appreciable difference. However, in a partial
subrogation, the original creditor may recover the face value of the debt by accepting
payment from the subrogee and recovering the remainder from the debtor. In a partial
assignment, the creditor may be forced to sell a portion of the debt at a discount and
may not subsequently recover the full face value. The creditor's interest in giving
partial subrogation rather than partial assignment may be sufficiently different to
account for the varying role of the debtor's consent in the two cases.
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ence of the debt, and the debtor can assert against the subrogee any
defenses he had against the original creditor.32 If the subrogation is
partial, the debtor can require the joinder of both the partial subrogor
and the partial subrogee, avoiding the possibility of multiple suits.3
Thus, even in cases of partial subrogation, the debtor is not preju-
diced and the court correctly viewed his lack of consent as immater-
ial.
Susan Kelly
CONTRIBUTION IN NON-COLLISION MARITIME CASES
Sessions, a longshoreman, was employed by Mid-Gulf Steve-
dores, Inc. to load a vessel in the Port of Houston. While walking atop
cargo previously loaded in Mobile by Cooper Stevedoring Co., he
stepped into a concealed gap, sustaining injury. Thereafter, Sessions
recovered damages from the vessel and the vessel sought contribution
from Cooper Stevedoring. In affirming the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals,I the United States Supreme Court held that contribution is
permissible between joint tortfeasors in non-collision maritime cases
if the party against whom contribution is sought is not immune from
liability by statute. Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417
U.S. 106 (1974).
32. E.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Gallien, 111 So. 2d 571 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1959); Motor Ins. Corp. v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 52 So. 2d 311
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1951); International Paper Co. v. Arkansas & Louisiana M. Ry. Co.,
35 So. 2d 769 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948). Since the subrogee is subject to all defenses
available to the debtor against the original creditor, and the subrogee can recover only
the amount expended, a third party will seldom pay the debt of another and request a
conventional subrogation from the original creditor, unless it is in his own interest to
do so. While the general contractor in the instant case could have let the supplier file
his lien, requested that the subcontractor bond the lien, and paid the supplier only in
case the subcontractor refused, it was more advantageous to the general contractor to
keep the supplier from filing the lien. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1973-1974 Term-Security Devices, 35 LA. L. REv. 321, 325-26 (1975), discussing
the instant case.
33. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 697 provides: "An incorporeal real right to which a person
has been subrogated, either conventionally or by effect of law, shall be enforced judi-
cially by: (1) the subrogor and the subrogee, when the subrogation is partial; or (2)
the subrogee, when the entire right is subrogated." The official comment to the article
indicates that both the partial subrogee and the partial subrogor are necessary parties
to a suit enforcing the subrogated claim, and the defendant waives his exception unless
he timely objects to the nonjoinder of a necessary party. Since in most cases the debtor
will be able to join both partial subrogee and partial subrogor, the instant case poses
no significant impediment to judicial economy.
1. Sessions v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 479 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1973).
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